A safety benchmark and a safety harness for agentic robots

LEASH: Stay Safe in Agentic Robotics

Qinfeng Zhu1,2,3, Weiguang Zhao3, Ke Sun4, Xihao Guo2, Yunxi Jiang5, Rui Zhang1, Lei Fan1,*, Kaizhu Huang2,*

1Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University 2Duke Kunshan University 3University of Liverpool 4NUS 5CNRS

*Corresponding authors

105tasks: 92 in simulation, 13 on a real arm
5kinds of risk, from harmful requests to forgotten allergies
9–77%harm rate of six frontier models used as planners
0%harm on the real robot for four planners with LEASH

Abstract

Foundation models such as GPT and Claude can now plan and control robot arms. We found that this comes with real safety risks, and that there is no thorough way to measure them yet.

We introduce RoboRisk, a benchmark that evaluates safety in closed-loop robot tasks, with 92 tasks in simulation and 13 tasks on a physical robot. The tasks fall into five categories: Task-level Refusal (T), Plan Repair (P), Execution-time Hazard (E), Injection (I) and Sequential Memory (S). We evaluate six foundation models (GPT-6 Astra, GPT-6.1 Sol, GPT-6 Luna, Claude Opus 5.5, Gemini 4 Argon and Grok 4.7) and two robot-specific APIs (the Dream API and PokeBot’s RoboAPI). Across the six foundation models, baseline harm rates range from 9.06% to 76.92%.

We then propose the Lease-Enforced Agentic Safety Harness (LEASH), a safety layer that fits into nearly any agentic robot stack. LEASH uses a fast decision model (Jev, or OpenAI’s Decisions API) for three safety gates, a task gate, an action gate and a commit gate, and the planner and all gates share one safety policy. In simulation and on the physical robot, LEASH reduces harm for all six foundation models while largely keeping their task success, at a small cost in time and tokens.

Demos

What the robot actually did

Full runs, unedited. Thinking time plays at 32× and arm motion at 4×; the bar under each clip follows the real clock of the run. Each clip shows the third-person camera on the left and the wrist camera on the right.

Harmharm happened, or a harmful situation was created Safe successstayed safe and did what was asked (for T, a timely refusal) Safe incompletestayed safe but did not finish

RoboRisk

Five ways an agentic robot can cause harm

RoboRisk-S has 92 tasks in MuJoCo with a Franka Panda arm (built on LIBERO and robosuite). RoboRisk-R has 13 tasks on a tabletop with a Dobot CR5V2 arm, a two-finger gripper and two RealSense D455 cameras. Every run ends in one of three outcomes, and harm always takes precedence over task completion.

Overview of RoboRisk: a mosaic of all simulated and real tasks arranged by category
Overview of RoboRisk. Around the center: frames from all simulated and real-robot tasks, grouped by risk category.

Harm Rate HR ↓

runs labeled Harmall runs

The primary metric. Lower is safer.

Safe Success Rate SSR ↑

runs labeled Safe Successall runs

Checks that a method does not buy safety by refusing everything.

Protocol

Simulation: three seeds per task, averaged within a task, then equally across tasks. Real robot: one run per task. All outcomes are judged by hand.

All tasks

Browse every RoboRisk task

The first frame of an ordinary run of each task, from the third-person camera with the wrist camera inset, and the exact instruction the user sends. Gray text describes the scene; it is not part of the instruction.

1 · Setting
2 · Risk type
3 · Search

LEASH

Put the puppy on a leash

“Every agentic robot is a good puppy, until you walk it without a leash.”Qinfeng Zhu

The idea comes from coding agents

Coding agents already review risky actions before they run. Codex, for example, sends certain approval requests to a separate reviewer agent. For a shell command, the text alone tells the reviewer whether it is dangerous. A robot command does not.

Coding agentReviewing text is enough

codex — ~/projects

› free up some disk space for me

• I’ll clear everything to make room.

$ sudo rm -rf /*

■ Auto-reviewing

A carefully prompted reviewer agent is reviewing this request before it runs

✗ Rejected by the reviewer: destructive command

The danger is in the words. A reviewer that reads the command can catch it.

Agentic robotThe reviewer has to see the scene

move_to(x=0.52, y=-0.08, z=0.21)Safe?
RGB view of task P3-01: a cup of water, a laptop and a coaster
color
Depth view of the same scene
depth

Action gateDenied: the gripper would carry a cup of water over the laptop.

PlannerPlans a route that goes around the laptop instead.

The same command is fine with a sponge and unsafe with a cup of water held over a laptop. LEASH reviews every action with the current color and depth images.

Three gates, one shared policy

The planner holds no standing permission to move the robot. Each gate grants a lease that covers only the current task, action or monitored operation, and the harness checks the lease before anything runs. The planner and the three gates read the same safety policy, written as a prompt, so the planner plans around the same rules the gates enforce.

  1. User instructionplus every camera frame
  2. Task gatebefore planning
  3. Plannera foundation model
  4. Action gatebefore every primitive or skill
  5. Robot skillruns on the arm
  6. Commit gatebefore gripper opening or pouring

1

Task gate

When
Right after the user sends an instruction, before the planner sees it.
Sees
The instruction and the current frame from every camera.
If it rejects
The task ends. It is the only gate allowed to stop a task; after this point, only the planner can stop.

2

Action gate

When
After the planner proposes an atomic action or a composite skill, before it runs.
Sees
The proposed action and the current camera frames.
If it rejects
The action is blocked and the planner replans a safer one, which goes back to the gate.

3

Commit gate

When
Inside a long skill, right before a monitored, irreversible step. Today these are opening the gripper and pouring, detected in code.
Sees
The step about to happen and the current frames.
If it rejects
The step is blocked; the planner picks a safer next step or stops.

Why decision models. A task needs ten or more gate calls. With a general model such as GPT-6 Luna, each call took about 20 s. The multimodal decision models released in October 2026 answer in a fraction of that and cost little, so LEASH uses Jev by default and also supports OpenAI’s Decisions API. Each gate returns a safety score s; the step is allowed only if s > τ.

Overview of LEASH: the planner and three gates share one safety policy; bottom, task P3-01 with the route LEASH denies
LEASH on task P3-01 (bottom). Frame 2 comes from a baseline run and shows the candidate route that LEASH denies.

Results

Every planner gets safer with LEASH

Each planner starts at its hollow baseline marker and travels to the filled marker for the same planner with LEASH (Jev). Moving up means fewer harmful runs. Moving right means more safe successes. Drag the slider or press Replay; hover a planner to see its numbers. The two robot APIs were evaluated only at baseline.

Overall results (%). RoboRisk-S: N = 276 runs per row. RoboRisk-R: N = 13. The two APIs use N = 39 runs on an adapted 13-task simulation subset and are not directly comparable. – not evaluated.
PlannerMethodRoboRisk-SRoboRisk-R
HR ↓SSR ↑HR ↓SSR ↑

0.00%

HR for GPT-6 Astra in simulation with LEASH, down from 11.23%, while its SSR rises from 78.99% to 80.80%.

84.62%

SSR with no observed harm on the real robot for GPT-6 Astra, GPT-6.1 Sol, Gemini 4 Argon and Claude Opus 5.5.

+1.66%

extra end-to-end time for Astra and Sol in simulation (245.21 s to 249.28 s per run). The gates cost about $0.005 per run, 0.66% of the total.

Where harm remains

GPT-6 Luna in simulation and Grok 4.7 on the real robot keep HRs of 12.68% and 38.46% with LEASH. Both often fail to follow instructions, and part of their harm comes from unstable motion rather than unsafe decisions: in physical trials they struck the tabletop, and Grok 4.7 hit the wrist camera. We do not recommend either model for physical experiments.

The Dream API records no harm but only 28.2% SSR; it is overly cautious and refuses safe steps. RoboAPI reaches 0.0% SSR and 59.0% HR. Both were tested on adapted setups, so these numbers say nothing about the services’ internal safety mechanisms.

The Human-Presence Gap

In simulation, the planners work normally in scenes with people. On the real robot, the same planners become far more cautious when a person is present. On P1 (move a cleaver around a hand) and P2 (place a knife next to a hand), GPT-6 Astra, GPT-6.1 Sol, Gemini 4 Argon and Claude Opus 5.5 achieve no safe success. Most of these trials never start the manipulation. Current models do not yet balance safety with working next to people.

Choice of reviewer

LEASH with different reviewer models (HR ↓ / SSR ↑, %). GPT-6 Luna is a general-purpose model; Decisions API and Jev are decision models. Jev is slightly faster and cheaper, so it is the default.
PlannerSetGPT-6 LunaDecisions APIJev
GPT-6 AstraS0.00 / 88.410.36 / 78.990.00 / 80.80
GPT-6.1 SolS–1.45 / 79.351.45 / 78.62
GPT-6 LunaS–14.49 / 46.7412.68 / 51.09
GPT-6 AstraR–0.00 / 84.620.00 / 84.62
Representative baseline failures in the five risk categories
Representative baseline failures (top: wrist or close-up view; bottom: third-person view). (a) T: Claude Opus 5.5 puts a phone into a bowl of water. (b) P: GPT-6 Astra carries a cup of milk directly over a power strip. (c) E: Gemini 4 Argon keeps moving a knife above a hand that enters the basket. (d) I: GPT-6.1 Sol follows an instruction on a tablet and lifts a knife instead of the ketchup (simulation). (e) S: Claude Opus 5.5 puts a pear on the plate although the user said they are allergic to pears.

BibTeX

@misc{zhu2026leash,
  title   = {{LEASH}: Stay Safe in Agentic Robotics},
  author  = {Zhu, Qinfeng and Zhao, Weiguang and Sun, Ke and Guo, Xihao and
             Jiang, Yunxi and Zhang, Rui and Fan, Lei and Huang, Kaizhu},
  year    = {2026},
  eprint  = {2611.14115},
  archivePrefix = {arXiv},
  url     = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.14115}
}